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RATERS REALLY MATTER? EVIDENCE FROM MAINLAND 
CHINA 
Jiannan Wu, Yuqian Yang 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the trust that public servants have in Chinese citizens using a 
typical public service rating and ranking system: the Assessment and Discussion of 
Professional Ethos (ADPE). We pose questions on whether public servants expressed 
concerns about trusting citizens as raters, whether the seemingly low interest of citizens 
in rating means that their ratings are reliable, what the relationship was between low 
trust and the citizens, whether the ADPE was an incentive, and public service 
responsiveness after the ADPE had been completed. These questions are assessed by (1) 
a content analysis of official and scholastic ADPE articles, (2) a survey of municipal 
officials in Yuncheng City where an ADPE operated for several years and (3) the 
opinions of interviewees. The content analysis reveals that public servants seemed to 
trust citizens, but the survey data reveals that the opposite might be true. Nevertheless, 
low trust in citizens did not affect either public service responsiveness or 
incentivization. Using a gaming perspective, we argue that the ADPE might be an 
ineffective institutional arrangement. We suggest methods for eliminating public 
servants lack of trust that include enhancing the value of trust shown in citizens, making 
trust matter, developing techniques to select citizens experienced in using public 
services for rankings, and enhancing the transparency of the rating information.  
Keywords – China, Citizen Participation, Performance Measurement, Public Servants 
INTRODUCTION 
China’s government has changed the way in which the public sector is evaluated. In 
August 1990, the Prime Minister mandated that local public sector departments should 
allow citizens to comment on the quality of the services they offer as a way of 
addressing maladministration and client discontent. This practice has evolved to include 
the current Assessment and Discussion of Professional Ethos(ADPE). For nearly two 
decades, the ADPE has been advocated by government officials as an effective method 
of hearing citizen concerns. However, its ability to reflect the genuine views of citizens 
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is questioned by practitioners and scholars alike. This practice is unfamiliar to 
international public administration studies, and domestic research concerning its 
effectiveness has been underway for less than five years. 
This article concentrates on the effectiveness of the ADPE from a perspective similar to 
that taken by English language scholars  (Melkers and Thomas 1998; Yang, 2005; 
Poister and Thomas, 2007), but conducted in a Chinese context with a hierarchical 
culture and the coexistence of within-sector ranking in some areas and cross-sector 
ranking in others. From a  cultural perspective, we expect that Chinese public servants 
would be concerned with pleasing the authorities by obtaining excellent ranking results. 
However, the question is whether they trust citizens to rate them fairly, especially when 
there is a perception of low trust in the provision of public services. This article asks 
whether officials have trusted citizens to act as raters and shows how officials have 
believed that citizens would fail to rate government services properly. First, we 
elaborate the ADPE procedure, highlighting citizen participation and contributions. We 
then review articles published in Chinese language journals to present the state of the art 
and scholastic progress in relation to the ADPE. From a sample of 194 related articles, 
we find that only a minority of local public servants have demonstrated low trust in 
citizens. We then examine whether inattention means higher trust by examining the 
results of a survey of municipal officials from Yuncheng whose working units had been 
subjected to ADPE ratings. Those results indicated that the officials distrusted citizens 
and thought that trusting them was not crucial to rating and ranking. We discuss this 
discrepancy by analyzing the gaming behavior of public sector departments. Some 
technical flaws in the ADPE process are identified, which could cause apathy among 
public servants about trusting citizens. Finally, we suggest how to enhance the utility of 
trusting citizens in relation to the ADPE, which will increase the effectiveness of this 
public service rating and ranking process. 
Note that there is scant international attention paid to public service rating and ranking 
in mainland China. Answering the questions we pose will mean describing the 
characteristics of official trust in citizens in a specific performance-evaluation context, 
adding new findings to the literature on public servants’ trust in citizens, and suggesting 
how the public service rating and ranking system in China might be improved.  
A PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC SERVANTS’ TRUST IN CITIZENS 
Trust has been defined as ‘the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party’ 
(Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). Based on agency and social exchange theories, 
Whitener et al. (1998) asserted that trust should be initiated by mangers because they 
can ‘exert the greatest degree of volitional control over their own actions,’ and that such 
trusting behavior would generate reciprocal trust from employees. Public management 
research has investigated the nature and propositions of trust (see Bianco, 1994; Ruscio, 
1996; Peel, 1998), generation of trust (Wang, 2007) and the consequences of trust (i.e. 
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the implementation of trust, see Yang, 2005). Offe (1999) argued that trust has four 
dimensions: 
(1) Citizen trust in fellow citizens, which has been discussed in social capital studies; 
(2) Citizen trust in elites, which was frequently studied in the literature on trust in 
government;  
(3) Political elites’ trust in other elites; and  
(4) Political elites’ trust in citizens.  
However, these four dimensions of trust have been discussed unevenly, mainly because 
they are related to different problems. Knowing that trust is mutual and reciprocal 
(Yang, 2005), the first and fourth types above are fundamental for citizens’ rating and 
ranking of public services because evaluating performance is a social exchange activity 
in which the public sector provides services in exchange for citizen satisfaction, and 
citizens in turn offer time and energy to maintain or reinforce satisfaction and gain self-
recognition by involvement.  
The findings of citizen surveys are the key to discussing trust. Previous studies have 
considered the techniques, process, and implications of surveying citizens for their 
opinions (see Stipak, 1979; Poister and Henry, 1994; Ryzin and Gregg, 2004). One 
branch of the literature relevant to the current study relates to the effectiveness of rating 
and ranking when using citizens as raters (see King, Feltey and Susel, 1998; Poister and 
Streib, 1999; Berner 1999) and has pinpointed some problems (see Ballantine et al., 
1998; Lawton et al., 2000; and McKevitt and Lawton, 1996) but did not explicitly 
address administrators’ trust in citizens until Yang (2005b) explored the ‘missing link’ 
and concluded that ‘in order to improve citizens’ trust in government, one has to 
improve government trust in citizens’. However, what if governmental trust in citizens 
was of low utility when citizen participation was initiated in a ‘top-down’ form, as 
McKevitt and Lawton (1996) show? We assert that public service rating and ranking 
might be distorted by the institutional arrangement that allows citizens to voice their 
opinions with no regard to what these citizens mean to public servants. This distortion 
might deteriorate when the public servants succeed in gaming both citizens and their 
supervisors. If they win the game, trust in citizens will be of no use in enhancing public 
service responsiveness, which negates the utility of any public service rating and 
ranking system.  
Another point to consider is whether public servants will take advantage of the low trust 
in citizens to obtain incentives from their superiors. Thus, on an institutional level, we 
may find a mismatch of the key elements that cause the ineffectiveness of the public 
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When citizens are asked to rate and rank public services, the relationships between the 
trust placed in citizens, the incentives received by the public sector, and public service 
responsiveness may be moderated. The worst results would include: 
(1) The incentives not affecting the trust that public servants place in citizens; 
(2) Trust in citizens not significantly affecting public service responsiveness; and 
(3) The incentives not being determined by responsiveness to citizen concerns. 
The fact that the institutions involved do not generate these possible moderating 
effects demonstrates that they are vulnerable to gaming. We consider such a situation by 
discussing the ADPE as a typical way of rating and ranking public services in China. 
WHAT IS THE ADPE? 
The ADPE is the most widely adopted approach for citizen participation in mainland 
China. Since the economic transformation of the late 1980s, some public servants have 
been accused of taking bribes and asking for favors to provide services. Others have 
been accused of creating unnecessary red tape to delay service provision. Moreover, 
those requesting public services from local authorities have reported aggressive 
responses deemed ‘inappropriate’ even by the local and central governments.  
In August 1990, the State Council held a meeting hosted by the Prime Minister to 
discuss ways of reducing corruption and other inappropriate behavior in the provision of 
public services. A national campaign stretching from the central authorities to local 
governments (at the provincial, municipal, county, and district levels), covering various 
parts of the public sector was initiated. Since then, all municipalities have adopted the 
ADPE. Given this situation, the public sector could have two types of negative effects 
on citizen satisfaction. First, public servants might provide tardy or no service, such as 
when fire fighters reach a fire after the promised response time. Second, public servants 
might arbitrarily impair the rights of citizens by unlawfully charging fees, imposing 
forfeitures, interfering with civil economic activities, or even seeking illegal rents. In 
such cases, citizens will be unwilling and unable to ask for administrative help. Hence, 
they should be empowered and protected when demonstrating their dissatisfaction, 
which is why the ADPE was deployed. 
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A typical ADPE is initiated and organized by the Office of Correcting the Inappropriate 
Climate (OCIC). The OCIC realizes the requirements of the local Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) Committee, the CCP Discipline Supervision Committee, and the 
government. It publicizes the sectors to be evaluated, organizes the implementation of 
the ADPE, computes and promulgates the results, and reports to the local authorities 
and higher OCIC. Taking the municipal level as an example, a standard ADPE 
procedure often includes four stages.  
(1) Preparation. Municipalities set up a mechanism by which officers of the OCIC 
contact public servants, draft a scheme of how the ADPE will be deployed, and 
select and train a number of civil representatives to be discussants and raters. Often, 
these officers are retired public servants who were previously ranking officials, 
representatives of the local People’s Congress or of People’s Political Consultative 
Congress, managers in key enterprises, and so on. In the public sector organizations 
to be evaluated, a mobilization convention is often held to finalize this stage.  
(2) Self-examination. The leaders of the municipal public sector announce promises 
about meeting the civic demands and specific goals. Hotline numbers, e-mail 
addresses, mailboxes, and other means are made available to collect information 
from citizens. Fieldwork is conducted and citizens are invited to attend seminars and 
take part in surveys. Although not based on rigorous methodologies, these measures 
help the public sector realize its flaws. After discovering the causes of specific 
problems, public servants can address those problems, clarify misunderstandings, or 
promise to correct inappropriate behavior by a specific time. 
(3) Evaluation organized by the OCIC. In this stage, the municipal OCIC designates 
working groups composed of its staff and citizen representatives selected from 
various walks of society, and then collects their opinions on the performance of the 
public sector. The working groups are empowered to examines service quality 
without notification, interviews stakeholders, require the public sector leaders to 
report progress, and conducts citizen surveys. The OCIC hosts a meeting in which 
the working groups discuss the professional climate with public sector leaders face-
to-face. With multiple criteria including perceived quality of law enforcement and 
policy implementation, efficiency, transparency, service attitude, probity and anti-
corruption, and so on, working groups conclude with reports on the public sector. 
By aggregating the performance scores on each dimension, the OCIC then gives 
rankings to a variety of public sector departments. The reports together with the 
scores are submitted to two parties: the provincial authorities such as the municipal 
or provincial police department and the provincial OCIC. 
(4) Review. The OCICs at the provincial and municipal levels assist the public sector 
organizations reviewing how they will improve their performance. By comparing 
the reports and collecting further evidence from citizen surveys, the OCICs compute 
and publish the rating and ranking results, with excellent performers rewarded and 
underperformers sanctioned. For instance, a public sector organization will undergo 
a change of leadership if it is ranked last by citizens three consecutive years Note 
that the process of rating and ranking lacks transparency: neither public sector 
organizations nor citizens have full access to the weights among the indicators, and 
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the process is characterized by high ambiguity.  
POSSIBLE DISTRUST OF CITIZENS BY PUBLIC SERVANTS INVOLVED IN 
THE ADPE 
Citizens evaluate public sector organizations in two stages, which causes a possible 
level of doubt among public servants about whether they provide accurate, specific, and 
soundly based information. Figure 2 illustrates how citizens contribute to the four stages 
of the ADPE. 
Figure 2. Citizen Participation in the ADPE 
 
At the self-examination stage, citizens contribute their opinions through surveys, 
interviews and anonymous complaints, which are manipulated by public servants. For 
interviews and anonymous complaints, citizens have to submit evidence to support their 
claims or defend their allegations. Survey respondents might rarely have used the 
service in question, or might only have heard of it. Thus, the issue of distrust emerges 
for public servants as they might consider the respondents incapable of distinguishing 
their performance. The framework of citizen representatives is generated in accordance 
with the social classes and influences of public participants, so it does not mean that 
their knowledge on the performance of each public sector departments is adequate and 
objective.  
The diversity of service functions in various public sector department also cause 
unreliable ratings by citizen representatives . One official from the OCIC told us that,  
“Organizations that have more contact with citizens such as [those involved 
in] education and those vulnerable to civil risk such as medical services 







2. Retired officials 
3. Journalists 
4. Selected citizens; 






1. Survey respondents 
2. Interviewees 
3. Anonymous citizens 












   
 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 12, Iss. 1, 2011 
 www.ipmr.net  7 IPMR
accommodation service, often have surprisingly high scores in survey items. 
We are also figuring out how to balance the results.” 
Public servants may begin to distrust citizens when their opinions are used to rate and 
rank the performance of public sector organization with totally heterogeneous functions. 
Hence, our propositions are: (1) that the utility of the survey is crucial to the trust that 
administrators place in citizens compared to other participatory approaches; (2) the 
results of OCIC surveys are more heavily questioned by administrators than those of 
self-examination surveys because they are thought to  include the arbitrary opinions of 
inexperienced citizen representatives. 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
To depict the state of practices and examine whether public servants trust or distrust 
citizens as raters, we conducted a content analysis. We targeted ADPE articles 
published in magazines and journals in the Chinese language with ISBNs. Electronic 
versions of the articles were downloaded from the largest Chinese digital knowledge 
database (CNKI, China National Knowledge Infrastructure 
http://www.cnki.net/index.htm), on which articles from 1979 until July, 2006 were 
available. We used the source language of the ADPE as keywords and tried other 
synonyms recognized by the Chinese government that refer to the same procedure. 
After excluding duplicate articles, government documents, and one article that only 
announced the names of representatives, we compiled a sample of 194 valid articles. 
To describe the sample and explore the trust issue, we designed an analysis framework 
assessing the following characters of the analyzed articles. 
Publication Date. The year in which the article was published (ranging from 1990-
2006). 
Publication Ranking. Where the articles were published, including in:  
(1) National publications with high standards and a high level of popularity, often 
managed by national ministries;  
(2) Provincial publications managed by provincial governments and departments 
with less authority, including academic journals published by universities; and  
(3)Municipal publications managed by city governments and departments, or some 
municipal colleges.  
Public Sector Level. The level from which the ADPE stories came, including the 
national, provincial, municipal and county/district levels. When an article did not 
mention the level, we labeled it as ‘universal’. 
Evaluated Public Sector Organizations. Chinese local governments have large 
numbers of departments. Having surveyed one provincial government, we found over 
50 departments and used this to estimate the number of public sector organizations 
involved in the ADPE.  
ADPE Locations. The articles referred ADPE deployments in eastern, central and 
western China. The classifications followed the political trend set when the central 
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government decided to exploit the western part of the country in the late 1990s. Thus, 
two geographically central provinces were counted as western provinces. There were 
articles that avoided mentioning locations but commented from a macro perspective; 
the location was thus labeled ‘national’. 
Article Focus. From the procedure illustrated in Section 3, we found that the articles 
tended to:  
(1) Disclose the rating results of public sector organizations; 
(2) Review the ADPE stages that are just finished;  
(3) Announce the start of ADPE;  
(4) Illustrate the plans about how ADPE is be implemented;  
(5) Examine the effects and outcomes of ADPE adoptions; and  
(6) Report the ongoing progress of ADPE 
Concern about Trusting Citizens. Some articles discussed specific concerns in 
relation to trusting citizens to evaluate public sector services given that they might 
have asymmetric information, and others were concerned with how to improve the 
process by giving training to citizens.  
A Descriptive Analysis 
Publication Date: 2003 yielded the highest percentage of published articles, amounting 
to 18.6% of the total. 2000 saw the lowest percentage with only 7.2%. The decrease 
after 2003 might indicate that the ADPE has been institutionalized.  
Publication Ranking. Provincial publications accounted for the majority of the articles 
(69.1%), followed by national publications (29.4%), with only 1.5% of articles 
appearing at the municipality level. The preference for the provincial publication of 
ADPE articles demonstrates the attention given to the administrative hierarchy. 
Public Sector Level. The majority of the articles covered ADPE practices at the 
provincial level (69.1%), followed by those at the municipal (19.1%), national  (5.2%), 
and  ‘universal’ levels (4.1%). Only 2.6% covered the county/district level.  
Evaluated Public Sector Organizations. Excluding thirty-seven articles contributed by 
the OCIC that discuss and review the ADPE in more than one sector, we identified 29 
public services covered in the articles. Tax administrations were the focus of nearly one 
fifth of the articles (17.5%), followed by education (10.8%), agricultural services 
(9.8%), and medical care (4.1%). The remaining 25 public services accounted for only 
38.7% of the articles.  
ADPE Locations. 41.8% of the ADPEs in the articles occurred in central China, where 
social and economic development is facing significant challenges. This gave an 
opportunity to address the issue of professional climate. The Western provinces featured 
in fewer articles (22.2%) than the eastern provinces (27.8%).  
Article Focus. 30.9% of the articles were summaries conducted once the annual ADPEs 
process had finished, followed by reports on accomplishments at certain stages (29.4%) 
and reviews of ADPEs that had been conducted for more than one year (9.8%).  
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Concern about Trusting Citizens. Less than one fifth of the articles (17.5%) expressed a 
possible distrust of citizens by mentioning the significance of recruiting a higher quality 
of citizen representative, investing in training them, analyzing complaints with a 
discerning view of who they were made by, or assisting respondents when filling in 
questionnaires. This small percentage led to three further questions. In which year did 
the trust issue emerge? Which locations tended to be aware of the trust issue? Who 
cared about the trust issue? We then produced a series of cross tabulations. 
When did the Issue of Trusting Citizens Emerge? 
Officials have expressed concerns about trusting citizens since 1999. 2002 was a 
watershed year, before which the number of articles increased and after which the 
number fell. Officials might have neglected the issue for two possible reasons: that they 
had addressed it by recruiting a higher quality of citizen as respondents, and that the 
sources of complaints might not have been as reliable as outsiders expected.  
Figure 3. Year of Publication and Concern about Trusting Citizens 
By further examining the composition of the articles in each year, we found that trust in 
citizens fluctuated subtly year-on-year. The percentage of articles concerning trust was 
high in the first year, but fell after that (45% in 1999, 21.4% in 2000, 10.3% in 2001, 
22.2% in 2002, 13.9% in 2003, 16.0% in 2004, 8.0% in 2005 and 11.1% in 2006).  
This effect may have been caused by the OCIC reviewing ADPEs annually, listening to 
advice from the public sector, and adjusting the scheme accordingly. There were often 
winners and losers in the ranking tables, and one course of action for disappointed 
organizations was to blame the citizens. One official in a municipal Supervision Bureau 
complained to us that: 
‘It is really difficult to find the right citizens who know every public sector well 
in the ADPE. It is also impossible to comply with the [wishes of] public sector 
organizations in letting them submit only the survey results. That might cause 
faked data. We are embarrassed when the sector leaders complain to us that 
although they have tried, they failed to satisfy the citizens.  Even our senior 
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leaders have questioned why the results often make certain sectors happy 
while making others depressed. We think this might be caused by citizens 
having biased opinions towards some public sector organizations. We don’t 
organize them in “blocks” to make the ranking. This helps reduce inequality 
among the organizations.’ 
The horizontal ranking of public sector organizations might be a unique ADPE 
phenomenon, as rankings in other countries only compare organizations with similar 
services. The organizations might be frustrated by the belief that citizens are not 
equipped with adequate knowledge to judge their behavior and services, and that their 
competitors are ranked more highly because of superior public images and greater 
involvement in daily life. In summary, there was a significant relationship between time 
of publication and concerns about trusting citizens (Cramer’s V=0.273, Approx. 
Sig.=0.042)1.  
Where were Citizens Distrusted? 
Figure 4 indicates that public servants located in western China were the most inclined 
to express concern about the trustworthiness of citizen rating and ranking (27.9%), 
followed closely by those who could only be identified as being national (25%), and 
then those in eastern (16.70%) and central (11.10%) China. Public servants in the west 
produced more annual summaries and concentrated less on stage reports than did their 
central Chinese counterparts. One outsider in western China pointed out the risk of 
placing too much trust in citizens, but there was no such voice from central China. One 
could argue that there might be less ‘window dressing’ in the western Chinese public 
sector than in its central Chinese counterpart, in that the former was less reluctant to 
question itself (a point also made by Western scholars; see King and Feltey, 1998). The 
scholarly articles were relatively balanced in their coverage of the regions, and clarified 
public servant expectations about enhancing the quality of citizen responses to ADPEs. 
Articles focusing on the national level included the highest percentage of critiques by 
outsiders, with some authors indicating that competition for good rankings by 
‘correcting the climate of inappropriateness’ might in fact cause that climate to 
deteriorate. 
 Figure 4. Location and Concern about Trusting Citizens 
   
 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 12, Iss. 1, 2011 
 www.ipmr.net  11 IPMR
Given these results, it is plausible that public sector organizations in different regions 
have different expectations about the utility of trusting citizens. Western, eastern, and 
national public servants seem to have believed that an ADPE could be made more 
effective by enabling the collection of more accurate data. Future studies could examine 
how various locations utilize ADPEs given the prevalent bureaucratic climate. There 
might be a political preference for subordinates to report progress to superiors and then 
make that information available to the public. With this preference, concerns about 
trusting citizens would be concealed. Other public servants could be more interested in 
addressing the problem of inappropriate behavior, which would have meant that trusting 
citizens would become a major concern. However, the relationship between location 
and whether citizens were trusted was not statistically significant (Cramer’ V= 0.178, 
Approx. Sig. = 0.104) 
With Which Focus were Distrust Indicated 
Figure 5 shows the numbers of articles by different focuses in relation to trusting 
citizens. Stage reporters and retrospectors contributed the largest number of articles, but 
conceivers did not emphasize trust in citizens before an ADPE was implemented. In two 
articles written by ADPE participants in western and eastern provinces, there were 
concerns over the trust of officials in the quality of citizens. Outsiders had a higher 
tendency to reveal the issue (64.29%) than did academics (33.33%). It is evident that the 
public sector and the OCIC are not alone in discussing this topic in print. 



































It is found that the articles that contribute to investigating middle and long term of 
adopting ADPEs is the one that are most likely to express the concern that public 
servant are distrusting the citizens who rate their performance in ADPE. There are more 
articles mentioning this concern than those not doing so. This category is the only one 
in which the majority of articles reflects the issue of trust. It is important to point out 
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that articles focusing on examining the effects are mainly written by outside observers, 
for examples, the researchers in local and state universities and the citizen participants.  
Articles having the other focuses in contrast, present lower concern on public servants’ 
trust in citizens. Although those publications aimed on reviewing the just-finished 
ADPEs’ stages provides the second largest number of these concerns, the articles only 
has a small percentage in that category. The percentage is also very low in articles 
serving to reporting the ongoing progress of implementing ADPE. No article discusses 
this trust problem in the category of “planning the future”. This means that the problem 
of trusting citizens is not taken into account of improving the ADPEs designs.  
These findings reinforced our curiosity: did the low percentage of articles mentioning 
trust suggest that public sector organizations and the OCICs had already succeeded in 
finding qualified citizens or had providing them with better training and thus had their 
concerns eliminated? Alternatively, if concerns about the trustworthiness of citizens 
remained, what might have caused public servants not to suggest that the issue was 
significant? To elicit opinions from public servants who had been involved in ADPEs, 
we conducted a survey. 
SURVEY DESCRIPTION AND DISCUSSION 
The survey had two objectives. The first was to determine the major concerns about 
trusting citizens as raters of public services, and the second was to test whether trust in 
citizens actually affected public servant incentives and responsiveness. Surveys have 
previously been conducted on the extent to which public servants trust citizens 
(Melkers, Thomas, 1998; Yang, 2005b), but surveying them on their attitudes toward a 
specific form of performance evaluation was rare. Melkers and Clayton (1998) asked 
public servants to predict the perceptions of citizens prior to them knowing the results 
of ratings and compared the two sets of perceptions. Yang (2005b) found that public 
servants’ propensity to trust and their experience in interacting with the citizens who 
request public service and participate public forums had a positive effect on their trust in 
citizens.  
We expected public sector officials to embrace the fact that citizens were capable of 
rating performance, and if the ADPE was effective, trust might then have an 
advantageous effect on public service responsiveness (Wang, 2007). We thus devised 
the following constructs. 
Trusting Citizen Participation Capabilities. Most of the officials did not trust citizens 
because they considered them to have difficulties in producing ratings (Yang, Callahan; 
2007). We designed a scale of the ADPE procedure and the items used included:  
(1) Whether citizen respondents (CR) in the ADPE were familiar with the function of 
the public sector organization represented by the official respondents in our survey; 
(2) Whether CR were personally familiar with the public service process represented 
by the official respondents; and 
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(3) Whether CR, in the presence of others (i.e. the survey assistant, or the public 
sector organization’s working staff), could express their true opinions without 
interference. 
Incentives from the ADPE Ranking. The ADPE rankings produced political, economic, 
and psychological incentives for public sector organizations. All three could be either 
positive or negative. When concerns about trusting in citizens were unanimous among 
public sector organizations, given these incentives, we considered that those concerns 
were more reliable, but they might also have indicated the ineffectiveness of motivating 
administrators in trusting citizens. We thus devised two incentive variables: 
(1) How the official respondents described the reward they received from the ADPE; 
and 
(2) How the official respondents described the sanctions they received from the 
ADPE. 
Public Service Responsiveness. Under pressure from the ADPE, public servants might 
have changed how they reacted to citizen requirements. We thus developed the 
following items: 
(1) Whether the public sector organization tended to be more sensitive to complaints 
after the ADPE;  
(2) Whether the organization worked with intensified morale after the ADPE; 
(3) Whether the organization became more accepting of the opinions of citizens; and 
(4) Whether the organization anticipated hearing more opinions from citizens.  
These items were all measured on Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). As it might have been difficult for public servants to reveal their true 
feelings concerning the degree to which citizens were trustworthy, we avoided 
collecting demographic data. This is an effective way of allaying concerns about 
anonymity (Ryan, Chan, Ployhart, Slade 1999). Moreover, it was better to have a 
municipality focus for our explorative study. This is because although the central 
government has decentralized the power to formulate the design of ADPE to the 
provincial level government, the latter often adopts a position as a supervisor and 
empowered municipal government to formulate and develop their local ADPE designs. 
The chance came when a training program for public servants was launched at the 
university where the lead author worked.  
We developed a survey questionnaire after the lead author had finished his lecture 
commitments in the program. The sample was from Yuncheng Municipality in Shanxi 
province of central northern China. The municipality arranged for the officials who 
participated in its APDE to complete the questionnaire. As each of them was from a 
different organization, representativeness was high. 78 valid responses were returned 
from the respondents serving in the three county level governments that are randomly 
sampled. This ensures that in all the twenty six county level organizations required by 
the municipal government to participate in the ADPE is assessed.  
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The figures in Table 1 suggest that the public servants might not have trusted citizens, 
as we anticipated. Only one item exceeded 3 points, with the remaining two items under 
the midline, which implies that the respondents disagreed with the statement that 
citizens were capable of rating their performance. These findings were inconsistent with 
the findings from Western literature (Melkers, Thomas; 1998) and, more importantly, 
responded to our first question about whether public servants displayed distrustful 
attitudes toward the CR in ADPE.  
The incentive items revealed that an ADPE was slightly stronger in rewarding public 
sector organizations than sanctioning their inappropriate behavior. We ascertained this 
by comparing the average scores between reward and sanction incentive items. Given 
this evidence, the ADPE could be failing to reinforce the idea that inappropriateness 
should be punished severely, which implies that the public sector organizations were 
ineffective in some way. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Min Max Mean Std. D 
CR knew public sector functions  .00 5.00 2.63 1.17 
CR personally familiar with the public service process 1.00 5.00 2.63 1.03 
CR understood the items in the survey 1.00 5.00 3.12 1.12 
Reward incentives 1.00 5.00 3.05 1.20 
Sanction incentives 1.00 5.00 2.72 1.17 
Organization working with intensified morale  1.00 5.00 3.33 1.11 
Organization more responsive to civic opinions  1.00 5.00 3.14 1.09 
Organization sensitive to complaints 1.00 5.00 4.35 .85 
Organization anticipating hearing more citizen opinions 1.00 5.00 2.92 1.20 
Valid N (listwise)=78         
 
The variance in scores among the responsiveness items was noticeable. Sensitivity to 
complaints was considered to be the key outcome of an ADPE by a majority of 
respondents (Std. D=0.85). The effects on enhancing morale and increasing acceptance 
of citizen opinions were mild. Concerning attitudes towards ADPE, the finding suggests 
that there could be inertia in public sector organizations about hearing from citizens. To 
summarize, we argue that officials did have passive concerns about citizen respondents, 
that they gained more positive incentives than negative incentives in ADPE, and that 
they tended to be neutral in relation to how ADPE had improved their responsiveness, 
except for being more aware of exposing bad news to society. 
We performed a correlative analysis to explore whether concerns about trusting citizens 
mattered, the extent to which the perception of trust changed the responsiveness of 
public sector organizations, and what might have caused the concerns to be 
insignificant. Table 2 reveals that trusting citizens played an insignificant role in public 
service responsiveness, which indicates that low levels of trust in citizens failed to affect 
public service responsiveness in either a positive or negative way. The incentives were 
neither correlated with trust perception nor with public service responsiveness, which 
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implies that trust was not affected by how officials received an ADPE, and how they 
reacted to citizens after an ADPE was conducted. It might also be that even if officials 
did not trust citizens they still responded to them. 
Table 2. Correlative Analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. CR knew public sector functions 
----  0.67 0.30 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.02 
---- 0.00 0.01 0.25 0.19 0.45 0.65 0.37 0.86 
2. CR personally familiar with the 
public service process 
0.67 ---- 0.39 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.13 
0.00 ---- 0.00 0.34 0.65 0.39 0.76 0.30 0.24 
3. CR understood the items in the 
survey 
0.30 0.39 ---- 0.29 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.16 
0.01 0.00 ---- 0.01 0.09 0.86 0.77 0.64 0.17 
4. Reward incentives 
0.13 0.11 0.29 ---- 0.30 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.15 
0.25 0.34 0.01 ---- 0.01 0.16 0.83 0.54 0.20 
5. Sanction incentives 0.15 0.05 0.19 0.30 ---- 0.29 0.10 0.02 0.09 
0.19 0.65 0.09 0.01 ---- 0.01 0.37 0.88 0.41 
6. Organization working with 
intensified morale 
0.09 0.10 0.02 0.16 0.29 ---- 0.65 0.25 0.43 
0.45 0.39 0.86 0.16 0.01 ---- 0.00 0.03 0.00 
7. Organization more receptive to 
citizen opinions 
0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.65 ---- 0.23 0.35 
0.65 0.76 0.77 0.83 0.37 0.00 ---- 0.05 0.00 
8. Organization more sensitive to 
complaints 
0.10 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.25 0.23 ---- 0.20 
0.37 0.30 0.64 0.54 0.88 0.03 0.05 ---- 0.07 
9. Organization anticipating hearing 
more citizens opinions 
0.02 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.43 0.35 0.20 ---- 
0.86 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.07 ---- 
Note: the upper cell for each item contains the Pearson’s r, and the lower cell contains the two-tailed 
significance level  
 
The incentives generated by the ADPE did not significantly moderate how the public 
servants perceived the trustworthiness of citizens in providing survey data, except for 
one positive relationship between reward strength and concerns over how citizens reply 
to the ADPE questionnaire without interference. This evidence could be interpreted as 
public sector organizations with good ranking results giving credit to OCIC staff 
members who assisted CR well, in the knowledge that interference could be neither 
contrived nor resisted by those CR. 
There was a no noticeable relationship between incentives and public service 
responsiveness, which was contrary to the premise underlying ADPE – that the 
incentives should motivate public sector organizations to meet the needs of citizens.  
The only significant coefficient appeared in relating sanction strength to enhancing the 
morale of the organization, but the degree was low (Pearson Correlation=0.29, 
Sig.=0.01). In summary, the data from the survey indicated that the ADPE might 
encounter implicit problems other than the concept of mere trust. It was possibly the 
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ineffectiveness of the ADPE concept which caused a series of issues, among which trust 
in citizens was just one.  
To explain how and why the trust placed by public servants in citizens fails to 
interrelated the other variables, we adopted a gaming perspective in line with Bevan and 
Hood (2006), as explained in Figure 6.  













First, with an expectation that some public sector organizations had faith in the ADPE 
process, we started by supposing that an organization would be sincere in helping 
citizens to learn about how it provides the public service for which it is responsible. We 
call such organizations ‘authentic listeners’ (see King, Feltey and Susel, 1998). They 
might encounter either one of two extreme occasions: hearing many complaints or much 
praise (see Melkers and Thomas, 1998). These organizations take pains to correct their 
mistakes, explain to society the real reasons why their services are poor and request the 
opinions of citizens. However, given the increasing demands of citizens, and that they 
would have problems that go beyond citizens’ ability to address, the result is 
questioning the citizen objectiveness and the value of citizen surveys (Kelly, 2005).  
It is also possible that the apathy displayed by some public sector organizations toward 
trust in citizens is not significant because it is more efficient to complain to ADPE 
organizers about biased citizens and strive for favors from OCIC working groups in 
their evaluations. Hence, the positive incentives that lead to higher responsiveness shift 
toward pleasing the OCIC, which weakens the issue of trusting citizens. Even if public 
service organizations are not considering whether the ratings from citizens are really 
credible or not, they would excuse that the information quality is distorted due to 
citizens’ poor knowledge.  
Second, when authentic listeners face a spate of praise, they are pleased that they can 
report their high rankings to their superiors. However, the ADPE procedures remind 
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them that they should report their own errors to the OCIC. The organizations will then 
transfer their attention from appreciating citizens to addressing minor problems. This 
activity makes the self-examination stage seem fruitful, but because self-examination is 
separated from gathering citizen opinions, placing trust in citizen ratings and rankings 
becomes a minor issue. The objective becomes the manipulation of leaders’ perceptions 
within the public service or government, and responsiveness is only necessary to 
maintain consistent praise. This type of gaming is similar to that described by Courty 
and Marschke (2004), who showed that governments report their performance at the 
most favorable times. 
Third, public sector organizations as gamers in ADPEs might pretend to be listeners. 
When they receive a high level of criticism, they might provide the OCIC with 
fabricated data, concealed the public criticism and made false promises. After 
examination, they might report only what is beneficial to them. Their responsiveness to 
citizens’ concerns does not change because of the lack of effective monitoring. Finally, 
a high level of praise for pretend listeners means that citizens are credulous; the positive 
incentives generated by the ADPE process become the profit to be gained by cheating 
citizens and the OCIC, and a high level of responsiveness to citizens’ concerns is of no 
use and thus ignored. In this sense, the ADPE process has the potential to distort public 
servants’ trust in citizens, which should be essential for citizen participation in 
performance evaluation.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the evidence we have presented and our discussion, we suggest ways of 
improving ADPE effectiveness from a perspective of connecting trust, incentives and 
responsiveness. 
First, trust should have a utility that outweighs the benefit one gains from neglecting it 
or being actively distrustful. If public sector organizations had to pay citizens for losing 
their trust, and the price was higher than transferring the trust to other stakeholders, then 
those organizations would confirm to citizens that trust matters and take it seriously. In 
practice, citizens should receive grater financial compensation for being subjected to 
maladministration, which could be reported in an ADPE. A technique of testing or 
measuring trust in citizens should be devised as part of the ADPE process to ensure that 
if trust in citizens is low, an organization’s ranking will also be low. Organizations 
should be informed when they rank lowly in trusting citizens but should not be allowed 
to know by which indicator their distrust was exposed. 
Second, given the current mechanism whereby public sector organizations receive 
incentives from the OCIC rather than citizens, enhanced responsiveness should be made 
a real target by public sector leaders. Citizens would be more influential if they 
participated in not only the rating process, but also the budgeting process. Linking 
citizen survey results to the financial resources of public sector organizations and 
involving more citizens familiar with budget discussions in the process would be 
beneficial. The prerequisite for such involvement should be that only citizens with 
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quantifiable experience of receiving the relevant services should be identified and 
randomly sampled to rate public sector organizations.  
Third, our evidence suggests that citizens might not have been very well equipped to 
rate and rank public sector performance. There should be improved input to enable 
citizens to be more knowledgeable, and this should be communicated to the public 
organizations under review. We suggest designing items that test whether citizens know 
the organizations well and if they have received the public service provided within a 
given period. These two measurements might be allocated different weights, given that 
experience and inexperience both matter in a citizen survey (Kelly and Swindell, 2003).  
Finally, as the ADPE procedures shows, opacity in collecting, computing, and 
publishing rating and ranking data should improved to address gaming between public 
sector organizations and the OCIC: without a transparent process, collusion might be 
possible.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The institutional arrangement of public service rating and ranking by citizen raters 
might have a negative effect on public servants’ trust in citizens and may not decrease 
inappropriate behavior in the public sector. This is the first study to have focused on 
Chinese public service rating and ranking from the perspective of public servants’ trust. 
We have contributed to the study of Chinese public management by introducing trust, a 
fundamental component as theorized by agency theory and social exchange theory, into 
the consideration of a performance appraisal system aimed at inducing institutional 
reform. We systematically reviewed all of the literature written until 2007 by 
practitioners, anonymous outsiders, participants and scholars, and posed questions 
relating to public servants’ trust in citizens as part of the ADPE process. Further, with 
evidence of an apparent lack of focus on the trust issue, we have examined the 
plausibility that trust in citizens might be either guaranteed or ignored. We surveyed 
municipal officials and found they distrusted citizens and explained this by exploring 
the connections between trust in citizens, incentives, and public service responsiveness. 
The intriguing finding was that the rating and ranking arrangement actually distorted 
trust. We have suggested some techniques to make trusting citizens more valuable, to 
discern whether citizens are sufficiently prepared to rate and rank public services, and to 
enhance the transparency of rating data. 
Our findings are useful in explaining both the superficial and underlying discrepancies 
of outcomes in public service rating and ranking, beyond the current recognition of 
trust. For instance, the trustor might keep the perception of the trustee unchanged, 
knowing that trust might not reduce risk or generate a higher profit. The trustor might 
even avoid solidifying trust to make connections with the monitor of the trust 
Jiannan Wu is Tengfei Professor at the School of Public Policy and Administration at Xi’an Jiaotong 
University, People’s Republic of China. E-mail: jnw@mail.xjtu.edu.cn 
Yuqian Yang is a Ph.D. student at the School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, People’s 
Republic of China. E-mail: xjtuyyq@163.com 
   
 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 12, Iss. 1, 2011 
 www.ipmr.net  19 IPMR
relationship, in this case the OCIC, and remain only superficially engaged with the 
public. Practitioners should discern what type of trust they are dealing with. 
Specifically, the OCIC should know that citizens’ trust in the public sector is 
expressive, whereas public servants’ trust in citizens is linked mainly to seeking higher 
rating and ranking results. 
Methodologically, we used content analysis to present the current ADPE discourse, 
raising questions and untangling the subject with a survey. This approach was used 
because studies of this type are rare in China compared to the West. Using content 
analysis as the basis of a survey allowed an understanding of the public service 
environment, given the lack of academic coverage.  
We admit that the research lacked a well-elaborated theoretical cornerstone, and that the 
content analysis might be hazardous because of the identities of the official writers, its 
media-orientation, and because most of the articles were optimistic. In view of these 
limitations, future studies should elaborate on the situation further using principal-agent 
theory with gaming as the central perspective, conduct an extensive content analysis of 
all related articles, and further explore the survey data in relation to the four types of 
gaming by public sector organizations we identified to extract empirical evidence of 
public servants’ trust in citizens. The current study revealed that various parts of the 
public sector at the local government level in China might prefer to adopt the ADPE 
process. Examining the reasons for this will also be an intriguing mission when taking 
socio-economic development into account. 
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1. The Chi-Square test is inappropriate because nine cells (50%) have an expected count 
of less than five, exceeding the limit that 20% of the cells should have expected a count 
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